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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we examine Ricardian equivalence of debt and tax
finance in a world in which taxes are not lump—sum but are levied on risky
labor income. First, we show that the marginal propensity to consume out of
a tax cut, coupled with a future income tax increase, is positive under
reasonable assumptions regarding preferences toward risk. Second, we docu-
ment that the degree of income uncertainty facing the typical individual or
family is large. Third, we show that, for plausible utility function pa-
rameters and distributions of future income, the MPC out of a tax cut is quan-
titatively large. Indeed, the MPC out of a tax cut, coupled with a future
income tax increase, can be closer to the Keynesian value that ignores the
future tax liabilities than to the Ricardian value that treats future taxes
as if they were lump—sum.
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In conventional Keynesian macroeconomic models, a debt—financed
tax cut stimulates aggregate demand. As Tobin [1980] discusses, this
effect is central to the traditional conclusions that tax changes
might have a useful role in short—run stabilization policy and that
persistent government deficits reduce the steady—state capital stock.
This view of debt finance is implicit in many policy discussions
regarding the large current Federal deficits.
One possible objection to this conventional view, first noted by
Ricardo, is that it ignores the future tax liabilities implicit in debt
finance. In any finite horizon model, for example, the government must
at some point levy taxes to repay the debt. The present value of the
future taxes exactly equals the value of the debt. If the planning
horizon of individuals is at least as long as the horizon over which
the debt is repaid, then the replacement of current taxes with future
taxes could not increase individuals' perceived wealth. In this world,
therefore, government bonds do not stimulate consumer spending.1
The argument for the equivalence of tax and debt finance would
have little force in the absence of some account as to why mortal
individuals might plan over an horizon as long as that of the govern-
ment. In an ingenious paper, Barro [19T)4] builds upon Becker's E19T]
theory of the family to provide such an account. Barro envisions a
'In this paper, we work in finite horizon models. As Bryant [19831
makes clear, the important issues are apparent even in two—period
models. For discussion of Ricardian equivalence in infinite horizon
models, however, see Feldstein [19161, Barro [19761, and Carmichael
[19821.—2—
continuing family linked by intergenerational altruism; each generation
has the utility of the immediately succeeding generation as an argument
in its ownutilityfunction. This plausible assumption implies that
saving behavior depends in part on the intent of parents to leave
bequests to their offspring. Because of the nesting of the utility
functions, the family behaves as one immortal consumer.
The equivalence of debt andtaxfinance results from noting that,
as long as bequests are positive, no one's budget constraint is altered
by a tax cut. Only if parents are at a corner solution, in which they
would like to leave negative bequests but cannot, will they choose to
take advantage of the opportunity afforded by debt finance to increase
their consumption at the expense of their children. Otherwise, the
dissaving of the government is exactly offset by increased household
saving aimed at helping the young meet their increased future tax
liability. In this sense, the Barro result is a fundamental
Modigliani—Miller theorem asserting that overall saving in each period
is determined independently of the government's financing decision.
Barro [197)4, 19801andTobin [19801discussa large number of
deviations from the conclusion of debt—tax equivalence as various
assumptions of the formal theorem are relaxed. Childless couples,
alternative models of the bequest motive, corner solutions, imperfect
capital markets, and several effects arising from the non—lump—sum
nature of taxation and from uncertainty receive consideration. Tobin
argues that all these effects imply that the replacement of current—3—
taxeswith a package of debt and concomitant future taxes has a posi-
tive effect on aggregate demand. He says nothing, however, about
eitherthe relative importance of the various arguments or the quan-
titative significance of all of them taken together. Barro, on the
other hand, while acknowledging deviations from the original hypothe-
sis,concludes that they have indeterminate sign. Thus, he claims,
Ricardianequivalence is the appropriate benchmark case.
In this paper, we examine one particular deviation fromthe Barro
hypothesis (discussed by both Barro and Tobin) and argue that it has
both determinate sign and potentially major quantitative significance.
Barro [19714, p. 11151 writes, "It seems clear that, either in the
sense of effects on perceived total wealth, or in the sense of risk
composition of household portfolios, the impact of changes in govern-
ment debt cannot be satisfactorily analyzed without an explicit treat-
ment of the associated tax liabilities." Taking Barro seriously, we
offer such an explicit treatment, noting that taxes are not lump—sum,
but are positively related to income (indeed, progressively so), and
that uncertainty about future income is substantial.
We emphasize the stylized fact (noted by, e.g., Lucas [1977] and
documented later in this paper) that variation in individual fortunes
is very large relative to aggregate uncertainty. Thus, the principal
effect of a tax cut and debt issue may be an increase in risk—sharing,
leading to a reduction in individual uncertainty about after—tax income.
A general, though not universal, feature of optimal consumption plans—1l—
isa precautionary demand for saving (Leland [1968]). In this case, as
longas claims on human capital cannot be traded, a tax cut leads to
increased consumption. The reason for this stimulatory effect is that
the tax cut providescertain wealth while the future tax increase is
contingent upon future income. Taken together, these effects reduce
income uncertainty without changing the present value of expected tax
payments 2
The principal result of this paper is that in a stylized but
highly suggestive ndel with plausible estimates of the parameter
values, the marginal propensity to consume out of a tax cut, with asso—
ciated future income taxes, is likely to be large. Indeed, the MPC is
in the neighborhood of neo—Keynesian values of the MPC that ignore the
future tax liability implied by debt finance. Of course, the nchanism
we highlight is very different from the usual "bonds are net wealth"
channel. In our ntdel, the positive MPC is due to the reduction in
precautionary saving when the government, by reducing the variance of
future income, provides insurance to individuals that is not available
in the private market.3
Much of this paper is aimed at demonstrating the quantitative
importance of the risk—sharing effect on consumption. This effect
2Our examination is a partial equilibriumone, in that we consider
only the decision of a consumer in the face of a tax cut. Of course,
this partial equilibrium effect of a tax cut on consumer spending is a
prerequisite for the conventional general equilbrium conclusions.
3Chan [19831 provides a careful discussion of the importance of
missing markets for various deviations from the Barro Ixypothesis.
Varian [1980] discusses the possible optimality of redistributive taxa-
tion as social insurance. In this paper, we examine only the positive,
and not the normative, implications of the risk—sharing effect.—5—
clearlydepends upon the amount of individual uncertainty about future
labor income. Interpreting the model on Barro's own turf, whereopera-
tive intergenerational bequests are central, we need to consider not
just uncertainty about one's own income, but uncertainty about the for-
tunes of future generations as well. We offer evidence from the
available studies of income dynamics to show that the variance of the
forecast error is in line with that required for a large marginalpro-
pensity to consume.
As is well known, solving for the decision rule of a consumer
facing uncertain future income is intractable except in some simple
cases. Therefore, to show the potential importance of the risk—sharing
effect of a tax cut, we rely on the use of simulations. In particular,
we use the technique of stochastic dynamic programming to examine the
response of optimal consumption to the income tax cut and future tax
increase. Previous authors consider at most the sign of the risk—
sharing effect. Through the use of simulation, we are able also to
examine its quantitative importance.
II. The Model
We begin by examining the effects of a tax cut in a two period
model. All individuals in the model are identical ex ante. Their
labor income in the second period is, however, uncertain and there do
not exist markets through which they can insure against this risk.) We
1That is, we exclude markets through which humancapital
returns can be explicitly traded and also securities with which
individual—specific income risk can be hedged.—6—
consider a policy under which the government cuts taxes in the first
period, issues bonds to finance the tax cut, and increases income taxes
in the second period to repay the debt.
Each individual maximizes expected utility:
(1) E U(C1,C2)
where C1 =firstperiod consumption,
C2 =secondperiod consumption,
E =theexpectation operator conditional on information available
in the first period,
=thevon Neumann—Morgenstern utility function.
Before the policy intervention, each individual has first period labor
income 1l and second period labor income Y2 =1-'2+c,where £isa ran-
dom variable that has zero nan and is uncorrelated across individuals.
Although each individual faces uncertainty regarding his future income,
there is no aggregate uncertainty.
Each individual can borrow and lend at the certain gross real
return R. Wealth after the first period is
(2)
Second period consumption is
(3) C2 =RW++ E.
Inthe absence of any government intervention, each individual
maximizes expected utility (i) subject to the constraints (2)—T—
and (3).
Suppose the government gives each individual a tax cut T in
the first period. Since all individuals in the model are identical ex
ante, the form of the tax cut is irrelevant. Wealth after the first
period is
(2')Wp1+T—C1.
The government raises taxes to repay the debt in the second period.
Suppose it obtains the extra revenue by an increase in a labor income
tax.5 That is, an individual with income 2 nustpay
(b) tY2
in additional taxes, where t =thetax rate.
The government sets the tax rate t so that the total amount raised
equals the debt, which is RT per person in the second period. This
government budget constraint requires6
(5) RT =
or,equivalently,
5Note that capital income is not taxed. If itwere, then the
policy intervention would lower the after—tax real interest rate, which
would also affect consumption. Summers 119831 forcefully argues that a
lower after—tax real interest rate raises consumption. Since our goal
is to examine only the risk—sharing effect, we do not include capital
taxation.
6More formally, the budget constraintrequires that the tax rate
times income per capita equals debt per capita. As the size of the
population approaches infinity, the tax rate implied by this budget
constraint converges in probability to the tax rate implied by (5').—8—
(5') t =
Theamount of tax an individual with income Y2 paysistherefore
('c) (Y2/p2).
An individual's consumption in the second period is now
(3') C2 =RW+1-'2+—RT(ji2+
= + — RT+(i—
Eachindividual maximizes expected utility (i) subject to the
constraints (2') and (3'). The first—order condition is
(6) Eru1(c1,C2)] =IE[U2(C1,C2)]
The three equations (2'), (3') and (6) jointly determine the three
variables C1, C2 and W.
We do not solve for the level of consumption C1, as doing so
is an intractible task except in very simple examples. We can
solve, however, for the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out
of the tax cut as a function of optimal consumption. By implicitly
differentiating the equations (2'), (3') and(6),we solve for dC1/dT.
We find
(7) MPC= BCov[(R U22 —
— U2[EU11—2Rl2 +R2221—9—
The MPC is not generally zero. A sufficient condition of the MPC to be
positive is that R U222 —U122be uniformly positive.7 In the additi-
vely separable case, the third derivative of the utility function must
be positive. In other words, rginal utility must be a convex func-
tion of consumption. This condition is even weaker than the con-
dition of' non—increasing absolute risk aversion. Leland [19681 and
Sandmo 11970] discuss the more general case and conclude that one
should typically expect this condition to hold. Hence, the marginal
propensity to consume out of a tax cut is presumptively greater than
zero.
A common argument, made by Smith [1969] and Mundell [1971] among
others, is that bonds are net wealth because individuals discount the
associated future tax liabilities at an interest rate higher than the
rate on government bonds. One cannot interpret our analysis in this
way. A discount rate for human capital that includes a risk premium
and thus exceeds the government bond rate is not sufficient to generate
our results. For example, in the case of quadratic utility, optimal
consumption decisions display certainty equivalence, despite the risk
aversion of the consumer. In this case, the amount the individual
would pay today to avoid his tax liabilities is less than their present
value computed using the risk—free rate. Nonetheless, the MPC out of a
tax cut is zero, since the third derivatives of the utility function
are zero. The effects of debt and future taxes on the consumption
TThis result is demonstrated by noting that, for any non—degenerate
random variable X and function F(•), if F' is uniformly positive, then
Cov(X,F(X)) >0.—1O-
decision cannot be analyzed by reference to any summary wealth
statistic
III. The Extent of Income Uncertainty
The nxdel and the effect we highlight rely on the existence of
individual uncertainty regarding future income. Before turning to our
simulation results, we examine the evidence on the extent of uncer-
tainty regarding future income. As becomes clear below, this task is
not a simple one. In this section, we attempt to use existing analyses
of income dynamics to shed some light on the nature of' this distribu-
tion. The available evidence does suggest that the degree of uncer-
tainty is substantial.
We consider two interpretations of our nDdel. In the first
interpretation, the uncertainty concerns the income of an individual
within his lifetime. In the second interpretation, the uncertainty
concerns the performance of future generations of the family. We begin
with the former.
A. Individual Uncertainty
One interpretation of the imdel, analogous to many interpreta-
tions of overlapping generations nxdels, is that the two periods
correspond to the two halves of a single person's life. That is, we
can consider each period as corresponding to roughly thirty years.
8An alternative reason that the future taxes might be discounted at
an interest rate higher than that paid on the government debt might be
that individuals borrow and lend at different interest rates. See
Rotemberg [l981I for a ndel of liquidity constraints along these—11—
The policy intervention then entails a tax cut during a person's youth
coupled with a tax increase during his old age. Under this view, the
relevant measure of the uncertainty is that of a young person regarding
his income during the second half of his life.
In their analysis of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
Hill and Hoffman [1977] pose the question, -"Does an individual's econo-
mic status remain relatively constant over time or is there widespread
change in economic standing?" Their conclusion is that "change in status
is not only quite common but often quite dramatic as well." [p.30] In
terms of the "income/needs ratio" discussed by Duncan and Morgan [1971],
"less than a quarter of married men were in the same decile position in
both 1967 and 197)4, about 30 percent changed by one decile, and about 145
percent shifted by two deciles or nre." [p.30]9Not all of these
transitions reflect genuine "news" about lifetime earnings. Some are
probably transitory, reflect choices regarding change in occupation
or labor supply, or were forecastable by the individual. It appears
unlikely, however, that one can explain away the bulk of the variation
in this fashion.
Another finding from analysis of the PSID is that individual
incomes are highly vulnerable to disability, which includes medical,
lines. Such liquidity constraints, however, are not present in our
model.
9Hill and Hoffman also report that the largest share of variation
in the income/needs ratio comes from income rather than needs. [p. 33]—12—
psychiatric, and other factors limiting hours of work or precluding
work entirely. It is a mi.stake to conclude that individuals largely
insure themselves against income loss from disability. "Even when
transfers offset some of the impact, there was a $3000 to $5000 a year
difference in the family head's income associated with his or her
disability." [Morgan, 1980, p.285]
Taubrnan 119751 calculates a "transition probability matrix" for
individuals in his sample who reported earnings in both 1955 and 1969.
His numbers indicate substantial fluidity with respect to transition
from one economic status to another.-0 For example, an individual who is
in the 70th to 80th percentile range in 1955 bad a nine percent chance
of finding himself below the 30th percentile in 1969, and a better than
fifteen percent chance of falling below the 140th percentile. The pro-
bability that an individual beginning in the top ten percent made a
transition to the bottom half exceeded nine percent.
Hall and Mishkin [1982] ,intheir study of the sensitivity of con-
sumption to income, provide statistical estimates of the income process
that allows us to infer the degree of uncertainty. Using panel data on
households, they first use regression to correct family income for
life—cycle and other demographic effects. They then divide the resi-
dual into a lifetime component, which follows a random walk, and a
transitory component, which follows a second—order moving—average
process. Over a forecast horizon of thirty years, the variance of the
1-°Because Taubman's sample is more homogeneous than the general
population and he reports his transitions as movements between deciles,
these numbers do not correspond to transition probabilities between
deciles in the overall income distribution. The mean income in—13—
lifetime component far exceeds the variance of the transitory coni—
ponent. Hall and Mishkin report that the annual innovation to the hf e—
time component hasastandard deviation of about $1200. The standard
error of a forecast over a thirty year horizon is thus $6600. Since
the median family income during their time period (1972) was roughly
$12,000, the implied coefficient of variation is 0.55.
The uncertainty in our model is individual rather than aggregate.
This assumption is important, since the government cannot provide in-
surance against aggregate shocks to income. It is, however, also
empirically valid. Hall and Mishkin 'p. 48O] report that the
"overwhelming bulk of movements in income that give rise to our
inferencefrom the data are unrelated to the behavior of the national
economy; most are probably highly personal." Thus, the observed degree
of uncertainty is correctly interpreted as a measure of individual
rather than aggregate risk.
B. Intergenerational Uncertainty
A second interpretation of the model is that the two periods
represent two generations. The relevant measure of uncertainty is that
of a person forecasting the income of his child. Perhaps surprisingly,
it is easier to glean evidence on the conditional distributions of
Taubman's top quintile is between three and four times the mean in the
bottom qunitile, as compared to a ratio between seven and eight for
full—time male workers in general.— 14—
sons'and grandsons' incomes than on the conditional distribution of
own income. The distribution of a descendant's income presumably
depends on a small number of identifiable characteristics.
A classic reference for the distribution of earnings conditional
on family background, educational attainment, and occupational stutus
is Jencks [19721. Among his striking findings are:
1) Upper—middle—class parents are unable to ensure that their children
will maintain their privileged position. Among menborninto the ist
affluent fifth of the population, only i0 percent will be in this top
quintile as adults. [p. 215]
2) Correlation between parents' and son's permanent incomes is only
about 0.3.[p.236]
3) Family background explains about 15 percent of the variation in ear-
nings. The earnings of brothers raised in the same home would vary
radically. "In 1968, for example, if we had compared random pairs of
individuals, we would have found that their earnings differed by an
average of about $6,200. If we had had data on brothers, our best
guess is that they would have differed by at least $5,600." If the ear-
nings of the general population exhibited only the degree of inequality
characteristic of brothers, the best—paid fifth of all male workers
would still earn six times the pay of the lowest quintile. [p.219—2201
I) "Neither family background, cognitive skill, educational attainment,
nor occupational status explains mu.ch of the variation in men's incomes.—15—
Indeed,when we compare men who are identical in all these repects, we
find only 12 to 15 percent less inequality than among random indivi-
duals." [p.226
The following table compares several parameters of the conditional
distribution of earnings given father's education and occupational status
with the corresponding parameters of the unconditional distribution. The
underlying data are earnings of full—time, year—round, male workers in
1968. [Jencks, p.236]
Unconditional Conditional Distribution




Ratio of Mean of Top 5th
to Mean of Bottom 5th 7.7 6.5
Jencks interprets these numbers as evidence indicating a large random
component in the determination of life—time earnings. In summary,
"luck has far nre influence on income than successful people admit."
[p. 227]
Some studies, such as Brittain [1971], criticize Jencks on a
variety of grounds: for not using actual data on brothers, for
underestimating the correlation of income within families, and for
jumping to excessively strong conclusions given his evidence. But, as—i6—
the sophisticated studies in Taubman [19771 indicate, repeating
Jencks's exercise with actual data on brothers and with sore advanced
statistical techniques leads to almost identical conlusions. For
instance, Olneck writes, "The average difference between brothers on
earnings is 8 percent as large as the difference between random
individuals." [p.1371. Thusno parent can feel assured of even
roughly predicting his children's future earnings.
IV.SimulationMethod
The theory shows that, under plausible conditions, the marginal
propensity to consume out of a tax cut is positive because of the
risk—sharing effect. Examination of the degree of income uncertainty
suggests that human capital returns are indeed risky and undiversifiable
through contingent claims markets. We now turn to the question of
whether the risk—sharing effect is quantitatively large. We answer
this question by simulating the consumer's optimization problem for
reasonable parameter values.
We try both two—period and multi—period examples, and we assume
throughout that the utility function is time—separable. For the two—
period examples, equation (7) gives the analytical expression for the
MPC out of a tax cut in period one.'- The right hand side of equation
(7), however, must be evaluated at the optimal choice of consumption,
which in general cannot be calculated analytically. We therefore use
11For some of the simulations, the tax increase is not proportional
to second period income. In these cases, an expression analogous to
(7) is derived.— iT—
numerical methods to calculate the optimal level of consumption and
then use this value in equation (7) is arrive at the MPC's.
In the multi—period examples, we do not use an analytic expression
to compute the MPC's. We use numeric1 zthods to calculate the opti-
mal level of consumption in each example both before and after the tax
cut. The MPCoutof the tax cut is the difference in consumption
divided by the size of the tax cut.
Thetechnique used to calculate the optimal consumption levels is
stochastic dynamic programming.12First, the problem is formulated as
a stochastic control problem with one state variable (current wealth),
onecontrol variable (consumption) and one disturbance (income). The
state space is discretized using a technique suggested by Bertsekas
[1916]. For the last period of life, optimal consumption is equal to
wealth, and the value function is equal to the utility function. In
all prior periods, the computer searches, for each level of the state
variable, for the choice of consumption that maximizes the sum of
current utility and the discounted expected value of next period's
value function.'3
While the numbers are an approximation to the actual solution, we
can make the approximation errors arbitrarily small by narrowing the
12Zeldes [1983] describes this technique in nre detail, anduses
the technique to investigate some the the properties of optimal con—
sumuption in the presence of non—traded labor income.
13Whilethereare simpler methods for calculating the two—period
results (such as numerically approximating the solution to the single
Euler equation), the advantage of this method is that the same tech-
nique can be used regardless of the number of the periods in the
model.width of the grid used for the discretization.14 We tested our grid
against some simple examples that can be solved analytically. The
results were very close. We believe that our calculated MPC's are
accurate to 0.03.
V. Two—Period Simulations
We begin with two—period simulations. As discussed above, one can
interpret the simulations in two ways. The first interpretation is
that each period represents a half of a single life.
During the first half of the individual's life, he earns $100.
During the second half, he also expects to earn $100. This latter
income, however, is uncertain. We assume that second period income
follows the distribution:
=(l—x)100with probability p,
100 with probability l—2p, and
(1+x)100 with probability p.
With some probability p, his income falls below its mean value of 100.
One can view this unlucky event as a variety of possible outcomes. As
discussed above, the degree of income uncertainty is great for the
typical individual. The individual could become disabled, losing much
of his earning power. The individual might lose his job in a high—
l4See Bertsekas [1976]—19—
paying industry because of technological innovation or foreign com-
petition. (The steel and auto industries come to mind here.) Or he
simply could turn out less successful in his chosen occupation than he
anticipated. The first outcome in the list above represents the "bad"
event which, although possibly unlikely, r.y be sufficiently worrisome
to generate a precautionary demand for saving.
The distribution of the individual's future income is symmetric,
so that there is also a probability p of an extraordinarily good
event. Individuals find themselves nore successful in their careers
than they expected. This sort of event is represented in the third
outcome in the list above.
The second interpretation of the ndel is that the first period
represents an individual's life, while the second represents the life
of his child. Under this view, the individual is relatively certain
of his own lifetime income, but his child's lifetime income is
unknown. Indeed, his child may not even be born yet. He expects his
child to earn the same as he does ($100), but, as documented above,
one's child's lifetime performance in the labor market is highly
variable. His child may be less able or simply "unlucky" in one of the
ways mentioned above. Alternatively, his child may be extraordinarily
lucky and find himself with the favorable outcome. Thus, either
interpretation of the example is fully appropriate. For concreteness,
we discuss the simulation as if it were two periods of a single life.
We consider a tax cut that gives the individual T in the first—20—
period along with a contingent tax liability in the second period.15 In
the bad state, the individual pays no tax. In the two other states,
he pays a tax proportional to his income in excess of the floor income
(l—x)lOO. In expectation, the present value of his tax liability
equals his tax cut.16
The policy intervention we consider is a marginal tax change for
an economy in which taxes and transfers already exist. Therefore, Y2
is income net of these existing taxes and transfers. The income floor
of (l—x)lO0 is possibly due to existing government programs. We assume
that this income floor is not affected by the policy intervention.lT
Tables1 and 2 present the result of the simulations for two sce-
narios. In both, the real interest rate is zero CR=1)andthe uti—
lityfunction of the consumer is additively separable through time with
no time preference. In both, the single—period utility function
exhibits constant relative risk aversion. For the results in Table 1,
the coefficient of relative risk aversion is one, while for the results
in Table 2, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is three.18
Implicit in much neo—Keynesian analysis of tax cuts, such as that
1SThe MPC's reported are for an infinitesimal T; these are very close to
the MPC's calculated for a T of five percent of first period income.
l6That is, RT =EEt(Y2—(l—x)lOO)].
1TAlternatively, one could assume that the tax increase is strictly
proportional, rather than progressive. In this case, the MPCis
exactly the product of x and the MPCaswe compute it.
lBRecent studies that estimate the coefficient of relative risk
aversion find values in this range. See, for example, Hansen and
Singleton 11983] or Mankiw 11983].—21—
of Blinder 11981], are two assumptions. First, consumers set their consump-
tion in proportion to the present value of expected income. In other
words, their behavior exhibits certainty equivalence. Second, the
future tax liabilities implied by debt finance are ignored. Under
these two assumptions, the MPC out of a tax cut in a two period model
with no discounting is 0.5. Thus, we take 0.5 to be the benchmark
"Keynesian"estimate.
A. Excess Sensitivity
The first important observation is that consumption exhibits
"excesssensitivity" to current income. Much work on consumption, not
only that of Blinder on tax cuts but also that of Flavin 119811, Hall
and Mishkin 119821 and Bernanke 11982], rests on the assumption that
optimal consumption exhibits certainty equivalence. In this case, one
need look only at the first moment of income to determine the optimal
level of consumption. As pointed out above, under our other assump-
tions, certainty equivalence implies an MPC out of wealth of 0.5.
As Zeldes [19831 forcefully shows, utility functions with positive
third derivatives can exhibit "excess sensitivity" in Flavin's sense,
even though consumption is set optimally and there are no borrowing
constraints.The top numbers in Tables 1 and2 showthe MPC outofa
tax cut with no associated future tax increase for various degrees of
uncertainty.These MPC's aregreater than 0.5,thevalue one would
obtainassuming certainty equivalence.—22—
B. A Bird in the Hand
The bottom numbers in Tables 1 and 2 are the MPC's out of a tax
cut coupled with a future income tax increase. The tax change has no
effect on the individual's permanent income as defined by, for example,
Flavin. Yet the tax change can often have very large effects on con—
sunipt ion.
For example, suppose the individual has a one in eight chance of
obtaining only half his expected income and an equal chance of
receiving fifty percent more than his expected income (p =1/8,x =
1/2).We see in Table 2 that his marginal propensity to consume out of
a one dollar tax cut is 0.36, even though he will, on average, have to
repay the dollar to the government in the second period.19 Thus, the
consumer is Ricardian in taking into account the future tax liabilities
implied by debt finance and is Keynesian in increasing his spending in
response to the tax cut.2°
A comparison of the top and bottom numbers demonstrates the impor-
tance of the future tax increase as a factor mitigating the stimulative
effect of the tax cut. For distributions with little uncertainty
(small x and p), the tax increase almost fully eliminates the effect of
the tax cut on spending. For nderate amounts of uncertainty, the
future tax increase eliminates only half of the stimulative effect.
19The optimal level of saving in this example is T.5percentof
first period income.
201f income in the second period were scaled up by a constant growth
factor, the MPC's would be even larger than those we report. The
reason is that a higher fraction of life—time resources would be uncer-
tain.—23—
For distributions with large amounts of uncertainty, which appear to
fit the stylized facts we discuss above, the future tax increase provi-
des only a small mitigating effect. The tax cut, like a bird in the
hand, stimulates spending, despite the contingent tax increase.
Indeed, a naive observer might wonder if the consumer simply ignores
his future tax liability altogether.
C. Unlikely and Unlucky Events
It is particularly interesting to compare the two MPC's for the
x =1column. With these distributions, there is a small but non—zero
probability of zero income in the second period. In this unlucky event,
the individual consumes only what he saved from the first period.
The PC citofa tax cut, along with the future income tax
increase, is very large for all these distributions. Even if the
unlucky event is very unlikely (p =1/128),the uncertainty is suf-
ficient to generate a large MPC: 0.56 in Table 1 and 0.73 in Table 2.
Remember that if p were equal to zero, the MPC would also be zero. It
appears that consumption and saving behavior can be greatly affected by
small probability events.
One might argue that a second period income of zero is
unrealistic, since various institutions in society provide a floor on
income. Although the existence of such a floor is undeniable, it is
also true that there is some consumption level below which sur-
vival is impossible. Suppose that society provides a floor on income214
atthe survival level, C, andthatutility is defined in excess of
this survival level as:
u(c) =(C—C5)1—A
1-A
In this case, the results in the x =1column continue to apply,
regardless of the level of the income floor.
D. The Rates of Interest and Time Preference
In the above simulations, we assume that the real interest rate
between the two periods is zero and that individuals do not discount
future relative to present utility. Table 3 presents results that
relax these assumptions. Since the two periods represent two halves of
a single life, we use a real interest rate of fifty percent and a com-
parable discount rate. We find that a higher real interest rate lowers
the MPC's, while a higher rate of time preference raises the MPC's.
Ourprimary conclusion——that a tax cut can have a large impact on con—
sumerspending despite the future tax liabilities——is not affected by
alternative rates of interest and time preference.
E. A Multi—point Income Distribution
As a final two—period simulation, we try a multi—point income
distribution. Again, there is no discounting of any sort. We consider
the two periods as two generations. The father earns $100 with cer-
tainty in the first period. The son also expects to earn $100. We—25—
base the distribution for the son on the distribution of' the earnings of
full—time, year—round male workers in 1970, as reported by Jencks
[1972, p. 213]. In particular, the son's income distribution is:21








Wecompute the MPC for the utility function exhibiting constant rela-
tive risk aversion of three. The MPC out of a tax cut with no future
taxliability is 0.60, while the MPCoutof a tax cut with a future
proportional income tax increase is 0.1l.22 This latter value of the MPC
outof a tax cut is closer to the Keynesian benchmark of 0.5 than to
the Ricardian benchmark of zero.
To test the robustness of our result to alternative forms of the
utility function, we also compute the MPC for this multi—point distri-
bution using a constant absolute risk aversion utility function. We
21This distribution overestimates the uncertainty by including tran—
sitory and life—cycle variation in income, but underestimates the
uncertainty by excluding disability and chronic unemployment.
22The level of saving in this example is 23 percent of first period
income. This finding suggests that the precautionary utive for saving
may be an important explanation for the high level of bequests reported
by Kotlikoff and Summers [19811. Interestingly, the individual in this—26—
choose the coefficient of absolute risk aversion so that the coef-
ficient of relative risk aversion at the mean of second period income
is equal to three (the value we use above).23 In this case, the MPC out
of a tax cut alone is 0.50, while the MPC out of a tax cut with the
future tax increase is 0.214. Thus, the risk—sharing effect continues
to be important with this alternative specification of preferences.
VI. Multi—Period Simulations
In this section, we investigate how our results are affected by
extending the number of periods in the model.214 In particular, we
explore how the MPC out of a tax cut is affected by the horizon over
which the debt is to be repaid. The nodel includes five periods and
there is no discounting of any sort. Each period here represents a
generation. Income is independently and identically distributed in
each generation. Because family characteristics have little value in
predicting earnings, it seems a reasonable approximation to assume that
the uncertainty about the fate of one's grandchildren is not greater
than the uncertainty about one's children.
In a world of the type Barro describes, the MPC out of tax cut
equals zero regardless of the timing of the corresponding tax increase.
example would pay 36 percent of his first period income to eliminate
second period income uncertainty entirely (keeping the mean constant).
23Thus, the utility function is —exp(—aC), and a is 3/100.
2141t is not the case that increasing the number of time period
diversifies away i.i.d. income. Numerical examples in Zeldes 119831
demonstrate that, for a given income process and initial wealth, pre—
cautionary saving increases when the number of periods increases. This
result is closely related to Samuelson's 119631 discussion of repeated—27—
In a certainty or certainty equivalent nxdel with no futuretaxes,the
MPC equals 0.2. Thus, 0.2 is the benchmark "Keynesian" estimate.25
Table 1 presents the MPC's implied by a utility function with constant
relative risk aversion of three and no discounting of any sort. The
MPC for the case in which there is no future tax increase exceeds 0.2
by large amounts. Again, this effect is the "excess sensitivity" of
consumption to current income.
The results that include the future tax liability are dramatic.
We find that the repayment horizon is critical to the effect of the tax
cut on consumption. The farther in the future is the tax increase, the
higher is the the MPCoutof the current tax cut. Risk—sharing in a
later period has greater effect on consumption than risk—sharing in an
early period. This result is due to the fact that a tax increase in a
later period implies an earlier resolution of uncertainty. Indeed, if
the taxes are not raised until period five, the MPC's are almost as
large as if the taxes are not raised at all. Consumers have MPC's that
are very close to being "Keynesian," even though they fully incorporate
all future tax liabilities in their plans. Indeed, the MPC's we find
sometimes exceed the Keynesian benchmark of 0.2.26
The results in Table 14 assume that income is independently distri—
gambles.
25The low value of the Keynesian benchmark is in part due to the
absence of anydiscountingin ourexample.
26We also tried an intervention in which the government announces a
tax cut in period one to go into effect in period two, coupled with a
tax increase in period five. The MPC's were 0.03 for x =1,0.13 for
x =3/14,and 0.10 for x =1/2.For a tax cut effective in periods one
and two, coupled with a tax increase in periods four and five, the—28—
buted in each period. More realistically, income might be modeled as
containing both permanent and transitory components. In this case, the
uncertainty regarding income in latter periods is greater than the
uncertainty regarding income in earlier periods. The length of the
repayment horizon would be even more important in this case. The
results in Table 4mightthus understate the importance of the
repayment horizon.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the interaction between individual
income uncertainty and income taxation in the face of a debt—financed
tax cut. Under plausible assumptions regarding preferences toward
risk, the marginal propensity to consume out of a tax cut, coupled with
a futureincome tax increase, is positive because of an increase in
risk—sharing.An examination of the degree of income uncertainty
suggests that this uncertainty is substantial, suggesting that the
risk—sharing effect may be important. Numerical simulations show that
this effect is potentially large. Indeed, the MPC out of a tax cut,
coupled with a future income tax increase, appears closer to the
Keynesian value that ignores the future taxes than to the Ricardian
value that treats the future taxes as if they were lump—sum.
MPC's are o.16 for x =1,0.32 for x =3/1,and 0.16for x =1/2.—29—
A variety of issues remain open. We assume in this paper the
absence of contingent claims markets through which an individual can
privately diversify away his individual human capital risk. This
assumption appears a reasonable starting point for our analysis, since
these contingent claims markets do not in fact appear to exist. Future
research, however, could integrate our analysis with an explicit model
of missing markets. We suspect that the explanation involves some com-
bination of moral hazard and adverse selection. When incentive effects
on labor supply are admitted, the increase in insurance achieved
through tax cuts may or may not be optimal. Even if government
insurance is not optimal, however, a tax cut that provides insurance
may still affect the optimal consumption level of individuals.27 We
believe that, even after the explanation for missing markets is incor-
porated into the analysis, the risk—sharing effect of a tax cut will
continue to provide a substantial stimulus to consumer spending.
2TAlong the lines of Dreze and Modigliani [1972],onecan decompose
the risk—sharing effect into an income effect and a substitution
effect. We suspect that at the optimal level of government insurance,
the marginal deadweight losses exactly balance the income effect, while
the substitution would continue to stimulate current consumption.—30—
Table 1
The Marginal Propensity to Consume: Logarithmic Utility
The top number is the MPCoutof tax cut alone. Thebottomnumber is
the MPCout ofa tax cut coupled with a future income tax increase.
x=l/ x=l/2x3/1 x=l
p =1/128 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.76
0.00 0.01 0.06 0.56
p=1/32 0.50 0.51 0.55 0.73
0.02 0.05 0.16 0.56
p=1/8 0.51 0.53 0.58 0.68
0.07 0.17 O.31t 0.57
p =1/14 0.51 0.514 0.59 0.65
0.13 0.28 0.1414 0.58
p =1/2 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.61
0.141 0.52 0.58
Assumptions: U(C1,c2) =log(a1) +log(C2)
R =1.0
yl=100
(1—x)100 with prob. p
100 withprob. l—2p
(1+x)100 with prob. p—31—
Table2
The Marginal Propensity- to Consume: Relative Risk Aversion of Three
The top number is the MPCout oftax cut alone. The bottom number is
theMPC out of a tax cut coupled with a future income tax increase.
x1/)4x1/2 x3/l x1
p =1/128 0.50 0.51 0.61 0.78
o.oi 0.06 0,314 0.73
p=1/32 0.50 0.53 0.63 0.73
0.014 0.17 0.1.48 0.69
p =1/8 0.51 0.55 0.61 0.66
0.114 0.36 0.55 0.614
p =1/14 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.62
0.25 0.145 0.56 0.61
p=1/2 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.57
0.39 0.52 0.55 0.57





100 with prob. l—2p
(1+x)100with prob. p—32—
Table 3
The Marginal Propensity to Consume:
Alternative Rates of Interest and Time Preference
The top number is the MPC out of tax cut alone. The bottom number is
the MPC out of a tax cut coupled with a future income tax increase.
xl/1x1/2 x3/4 x1
R == 1.0 0.51 0.511 0.59 0.65
0.13 0.28 0.1111 0.58
R =1=1.5 0,61 0.63 0.68 0.73
0.15 0.32 0.149 0.63
R= 1.0 0.61 0.66 0.72 0.77
8I.=1.5 0.19 0.111 0.60 0.73
R=1.5 0.51 0.52 0.56 0.61
=1.0 0.10 0.21 0.314 0.147
Assumptions: U(C1,C2) =log(Ci) +1og(C)
=100
=(1—x)100with prob. 1/14
100 with prob. 1/2
(1+x)lOO with prob. i/14—33—
Table 14
The Marginal Propensity to Consume:
Alternative Debt Repayment Horizons
This table shows the MPCoutof a first period tax cut, varying
the period during which the future tax increase occurs.
Taxes Repaid x =1/2 x =3/14 x =1
In Period:
2 0.03 0.10 0.35
3 0.014 0.15 0.39
14 0.07 0.20 0.141
5 0.114 0.25 0.142
never 0.22 0.27 0.142
5




Y1 =(1—x)100with prob. 1/8 i =2,3,14,5
100 with prob. 3/14
(1+x)100 with prob. 1/8—311
References
Barro, Robert J., l97, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, Journal of
Political Econoxr 82, pp.1095—1117.
Barro,Robert J., 1976, Reply to Feldstein and Buchanan, Journal of
Political Econonr 81i.,pp.343—350.
Barro, Robert J., 1978, Public Debt and Taxes, in Federal Tax Reform,
M.J. Boskin, ed., Institute for Comtemporary Studies.
Becker, Gary, l9T1, A Theory of Social Interactions, Journal of
Political Econoiir 82, pp. 1063—1093. —
Bernanke,Ben, 1982, Adjustment Costs, Durables and Aggregate
Consumption, NBER Working Paper No. 1038.
Bertsekas, Dimitri, 1976, Dynamic Programming and Stochastic Control,
New York: Academic Press.
Blinder, Alan S., 1981, Temporary Income Taxes and Consumer Spending,
Journal of Political Econoii 89, pp. 26—53.
Brittain, John A., 1977, The Inheritance of Economic Status, The
Brookings Institution.
Bryant, John, 1983, Government Irrelevance Results: A Simple
Exposition, American Economic Review 73, pp. 758—761.
Carmichael, Jeffrey, 1982, On Barro's Theorem of Debt Neutrality:
The Irrelevance of Net Wealth, American Economic Review 72, pp.
203—213.
Chan, Louis Kuo Chi, 1983, Uncertainty and the Neutrality of Government
Financing Policy, Journal of Monetary Economics 11, pp. 351—372.
Dreze, Jacques H. and Franco Modigliani, 1972, Consumption Decisions
under Uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory 5, pp. 308—335.
Duncan, Greg J. and James N. Morgan, ed., 1977, Five Thousand American
Families: Patterns of Economic Progress, Volume V.
Duncan, Greg J. and James N. Morgan, ed., 1980, Five Thousand American
Families: Patterns of Economic Progress, Volume VII.
Duncan, Greg J. and James N. Morgan, 1977, An Overview of Part I
Findings, in G.J. Duncan and J.N. Morgan, ed.
Feldstein, Martin S., 1976, Perceived Wealth in Bonds and Social
Security: A Comment, Journal of Political Economy 81, pp. 331—336.—35—
Flavin, Marjorie A., 1981, The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing
Expectations of Future Income, Journal of Political Economy 89,
pp. 97)4—1009.
Hall, Robert E., and Frederic S. Mishkin, 1982, The Sensitivity of
Consumption to Transitory Income: Estimates from Panel Data on
Households, Econometrica 50, pp. )46i—)48i.
Hansen, Lars Peter and Kenneth Singleton, 1983, Stochastic Consumption,
Risk Aversion and the Temporal Behavior of Stock Returns, Journal
of Poltical Econour.
Hill, Daniel and Saul Hoffman, 19T7, Husbands and Wives, in G.J. Duncan
and J.N. Morgan, ed.
Jencks, Christopher, 1972, Inequality.
Juster, F. Thomas, ed., 1977, The Distribution of Economic Well—Being,
Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Kotlikoff, Laurence and Lawrence H. Summers, 1981, The Importance of
Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation,
Journal of Political Economy 89, pp. 706—732.
Leland, Hayne E., 1968, Saving and Uncertainty: The Precautionary Demand
for Saving, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Lucas, Robert E., 1977, Understanding Business Cycles, supplement to
the Journal of Monetary Economics, Carnegie—Rochester Series on
Public Policy, volume 5.
Mankiw, N. Gregory, 1983, Consumer Durables and the Real Interest Rate,
NBER Working Paper 11)48.
Morgan, James N., 1980, Occupational Disability and Its Economic
Correlates, in G.J. Duncan and R.N. Morgan, ed.
Mundell, Robert, 1971, Monetary Theory, Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear.
Olnick, Michael R., 1977, On the Use of Sibling Data to Estimate the
Effects of Fainlily Background, Cognitive Skills, and Schooling:
Results from the Kalamazoo Brothers Study, in P. Taubman, 1977.
Rotemberg, Julio J., 198)4, Consumption and Liquidity Constraints, MIT.
Samuelson, Paul, 1963, Risk and Uncertainty: A Fallacy of Large
Numbers, Scientia, April—May.
Sandmo, Agnar, 1970, The Effect of Uncertainty on Saving Decisions,
Review of Economic Studies 37, pp 353—360.—36—
Smith,Warren, 1969, A Neo—Keynesian View of Monetary Policy, in
Controlling Monetary Aggregates, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Summers, Lawrence H., 1983, Tax Policy, the Rate of Return and Saving,
NBER Working Paper.
Taubman, Paul, 19T5, Schooling, Ability, Non—Pecuniary Rewards,
Socioeconomic Background and the Lifetime Distribution of
Earnings, reprinted in Juster.
Taubman, Paul, ed., 19T7, Kinometrics: Determinants of Socioeconomic
Success Within and Between Families.. North Holland.
Tobin, J., 1980, Asset Accumulation and Economic Activity, University
of Chicago Press.
Varian, Hal B., 1980, Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance,
Journal of Public Economics lii, pp. 149_68.
Zeldes, Stephen P., 1983, Optimal Consumption with Stochastic Income:
Deviations from Certainty Equivalence, MIT.